2017: “Our Own Fake News”
At any given moment these days, my inbox seems to be flooded with results
from various surveys and polls conducted by or on behalf of MFP vendors and imaging solution providers. Along with fact-free
blog posts, vacuous tweets, and self-congratulatory Facebook missives, producing data on “what real people really think”
has apparently become obligatory in the cool new world of B2B marketing. But just because this trend is hardly unique to the
hardcopy industry, doesn’t mean we shouldn’t hold our own accountable for jumping on the “fake news”
Here’s a sampling of items that have crossed my desk in recent
months. Canon in December proclaimed that a survey it sponsored found “60% of enterprises will implement digital transformation
strategies by 2020.” HP in September released results from a consumer photography survey that found “Germans like
to photograph a lot.” Ricoh, also in September, revealed results from a survey of European workers that found “81%
believe new technologies such as automation and AI are changing how we work.” In November, a Brother survey found two-thirds
of SMB companies feel they need to do a better job “increasing the efficiency of business processes,” and about
half said “cutting corners on office equipment sometimes backfires.” And YSoft in August determined that 52% of
younger US workers thought their companies had “too many paper-based processes.”
Can you say, “Duh ?” I admit I’m cherry-picking these findings, but such
“insights” are typical of what vendors rush to tell the world. Sadly, these divinations are right up there with
“people like mom and apple pie,” and “most folks prefer lower taxes.” Will these genius revelations
It’s not that these efforts are necessarily intended to mislead or
disappoint, but far too many of these surveys and polls end up doing one or both of those things because they suffer from
two serious and intertwined flaws.
First and quite strangely, there’s often
no compelling reason why a particular hardcopy vendor or solutions company is bothering to sponsor or conduct such an information-gathering
activity. All too often, the topic is some variation of workplace/workforce/workstyle meets technology/solution/service to
produce innovation/transformation/evolution. Yet the questions asked are so vague — and the likely answers so obviously
predictable — that one wonders why a company would go to the trouble and expense.
Other times, it’s like the vendor is hoping to position itself as a source of “basic research”
regarding the IT landscape. Or it expects to discover some psycho-sociological “truth” that academic researchers
have missed. But that thin veneer of pseudo-selflessness all too often yields “findings” that are of little or
no value and have minimal applicability to the vendor’s present customers or its future business. Moreover, I’ve
yet to see a single one of these polls that explicitly — or even implicitly — tries to answer that most fundamental
of all questions: “So what?”
Second, even if the underlying goal or premise of the polling activity has merit, very often the methods employed
by the vendor or on its behalf are somewhere between questionable and laughable. It can be everything from a weak survey design,
to badly worded questions, to poor sampling methodology, to minuscule sample size. For example, one of the snippets I referenced
earlier came out of a mere 100 responses to an online SurveyMonkey questionnaire. Really?
Put these problems together, and you get our industry’s own version of what I call “fake news.”
Vendors produce surveys that by design are unlikely to reveal any meaningful findings or actionable information. And they
compound this by employing methods and tools that are incapable of assuring the findings are reliable or even real. It’s
sort of a new and unwelcome spin on an old saying. “Those who can, do; and those who can’t, sponsor surveys.”
That’s why in my role as an industry analyst and newsletter editor, I pay little attention
to these increasingly common PR pronouncements. And I have to wonder if anyone else pays them heed. Aside from the vendors
who want to create a vague aura that they’re on the leading edge of momentous change, one has to wonder why the companies
bother with these activities at all.
And then there’s the matter of opportunity
cost, which to me is the most frustrating aspect of these misbegotten polls and surveys. Instead of spending time and money
trying to be seen as disinterested market observers, vendors should be collecting and sharing data on what their customers,
sales prospects and channel partners are doing “down in the trenches,” so to speak.
I’m still waiting for the first MFP vendor who produces a credible report on why customers chose their
products over those of the competition. Or what about a poll on how low color page costs will really need to go before companies
are comfortable shifting en masse to color devices and output? Or how about a survey on the kind of suppliers companies feel
comfortable turning to for ECM, or managed IT services, or consulting services? These are the kind of results I’m interested
in seeing. How about you?
November 2017: “The
As I’ve often remarked to subscribers of The MFP Report, the editorial page
is typically the last, most challenging and most invigorating part of each issue I write. After more than two decades and
over 260 issues, I wonder occasionally if I’ve exhausted the list of available topics on which to pontificate. To help
allay that anxiety, I keep a folder of possible subjects, tidbits and reminders to inspire me. It’s a simple system
A case in point is an article I put aside during the summer. The title was “Why It Might be ‘Dangerous”
for IBM to Turn Itself Around.” It was written by Daniel Howely, and appeared on the Yahoo Finance news page on July
22. The article was inspired by the fact that IBM four days earlier had announced its 21st consecutive quarterly revenue decline.
But what particularly intrigued me were some quotes from Aswath Damodaran, a professor who teaches corporate finance and valuation
at the Stern School of Business at NYU.
Damodaran was quoted stating the following: “Not all companies
last forever. There is a life cycle to a company. They are born, grow and then decline.” He added that “Trying
to force growth in older companies like IBM could actually have a negative impact on them, because they might end up simply
throwing good money away.” Wow! In what other industry have we seen companies experience years of revenue declines and
billions wasted on misguided strategies to reinvigorate growth? As Damodaran concluded, “When you’re 75, you’d
love to be 35 again, but you’re not going to.”
What was lacking in the article was advice on what geriatric companies
are actually supposed to do when additional investments made in the hope of rejuvenation simply don’t or won’t
pay off. At the risk of sounding tasteless, impractical or even insensitive, I’d like to suggest an option. I call it
Corporate Hospice Care. Absent a competent strategy to regain growth, aging companies in declining industries at some point
will need to come to terms with death. So why not make it easy, dignified, and as painless as possible?
I speak from some experience.
Sort of. In the past four years, I’ve lost two parents and a dear friend to cancer. In each case, we relied on some
form of hospice care. Although the specifics can vary, hospice care is generally an approach that focuses on palliation of
the chronically ill, terminally ill, or seriously ill patient's pain and symptoms, while also attending to the patient’s
emotional needs. In an era in which the law increasingly ascribes personal rights to corporate entities, why not hospice care
Fundamental to the concept of hospice care is the idea that death is just a part of life. At some point,
the focus must shift from remedies and cures, to acceptance and a managed demise. In that context, hospice care for corporate
patients would seem to be a natural and even logical next step consistent with Professor Damodaran’s view that ”Not
all companies last forever.”
It goes without saying the hardcopy companies most vulnerable to terminal print-itis
are those who have the greatest dependence on hardcopy revenue. There’s still a pretty long-list of vendors who obtain
roughly 50% or more of their sales from printing: Fujifilm, Epson, Brother, Canon, Ricoh, Konica Minolta, RISO, Xerox
and Lexmark. And the degree of print dependency becomes more disconcerting as one goes down this list. Perhaps ironically,
while HP is certainly a top-tier hardcopy company, printing generated just 36% of its total revenue in FY2017.
This is not
to argue that all of these companies are doomed, or that each faces an equal chance of mortality. But it’s certainly
true that past efforts by Xerox and Lexmark to diversify away from printing have not exactly panned out. Indeed, Xerox, Ricoh,
Lexmark and RISO presently have shared no significant or credible path to lessen their hardcopy dependence, except for some
efforts to grow industrial printing. Conversely, expansion in the medical/biological field by Canon, Konica Minolta and Fujifilm
seems so far to be more promising.
So what might corporate hospice care actually look like? Foremost, it would require
acceptance of a continued downward trend in revenue, quite possibly with an accelerating level of decline after some negative
inflection point. It would also necessitate a laser-like focus on maximizing operating profit. Fortunately, that’s easier
in printing than in many other industries. To accomplish this, one would likely see further slashing of R&D expenditures,
even lower capital investment, reduced headcount, greater outsourcing of manufacturing, and further de facto “outsourcing”
of sales to channels. There’s also something to be said for treating remaining employees with the utmost compassion.
one might argue Xerox, Ricoh and Lexmark are to varying degrees already operating in accordance with such a prescription.
But of course, this kind of trajectory is easier to pursue for private firms than for public companies. Because of that, I
would expect to see one or some hardcopy companies undergo private equity buyouts. Indeed, one might argue it’s more
likely for some print-centric companies to go private than to be acquired by competitors in that oft-predicted final wave
October 2017: “Go Fourth and prosper? … I Hope Not”
As the old saying
goes, “Once is an incident, twice is a coincidence, and three times is a pattern.” So what do you call it when
the same stupid scenario plays out in the hardcopy industry for the fourth time in 15 years? Well, I call it a fiasco.
talking here about the massive financial fraud that’s engulfed Ricoh India and Fuji Xerox New
Zealand (and Australia) in recent months. But lest we forget, these twin disasters
were preceded by the original “Blame It on Brazil” debacle Xerox revealed in 2002 — which actually entailed
problems across Europe, Latin America and Canada — and the “Pain in Spain” mess OKI confessed to in 2012.
These four events clearly evidence a pattern of inattention at best and malfeasance at worst when it comes to basic financial
controls and fundamental management oversight among multiple vendors in governing various overseas sales subsidiaries.
Just to recap,
although none of these disasters alone was life-threatening to the company involved, each was a major mishap with serious
repercussions for the respective vendor. And the implications extended beyond just one territory.
Even after fifteen
years, the Xerox situation remains the mother of all messes. Issues in Brazil and other overseas sales
subsidiaries were at the heart of Xerox being forced in 2002 to restate its revenue for 1997 through 2001 downward by $1.9
billion, with a corresponding $368 million reduction in pretax earnings. Meanwhile, Xerox was dealing with its “unsustainable
business model” and was nearly on the brink of collapse.
Five years later in 2012 — and at
the other end of the printer industry — OKI had to restate its results for the prior six years because of irregularities
in Spain. OKI took a hit of nearly $400 million on net income and $100 million on sales.
the messes at Ricoh India and Fuji Xerox New Zealand remain
“works in progress.” Both vendors would like to think all the bad news is out and accounted for, but no one really
knows. What we do know is that between last fall and next spring, Ricoh could end up taking a hit well in excess of a half-billion
dollars to address years of fraud in India. And Fuji Xerox has already taken a
$340 million charge to net income for six years of fraud in Oceania.
a combined total of more than $1.6 billion in reduced earnings just for these four incidents! And that doesn’t include
the consequences of reductions in stock prices, market cap, headcount and sales. What’s so striking is the common themes
I see across these four situations. Despite different eras, vendors and locales, so much of what happened, why it happened,
and how it was handled is strikingly similar.
Consider that in each case, the underlying malfeasance was widespread,
long-standing, and significant in scope. The overstatements to sales and income were so egregious as to very clearly be “too
good to be true.” Yet even when employees raised questions — as they did invariably in each instance — their
concerns were easily and quickly ignored. In effect, the key constituencies in both the local sales companies and the corporate
headquarters were so vested in assuring that the subterfuge continued, it was nearly impossible to recognize the underlying
fraud and address it.
Of course, one could argue that for each of these vendors, the particular problems were geographically
isolated and have not been repeated ... at least as far as one knows. Indeed, it’s tempting to believe that hardcopy
vendors both individually and collectively have learned the requisite lessons from these past blunders. But one wonders why
the first one or two instances would not already have been sufficiently didactic. So I’m left to ponder. Who’s
next? Where? And when?
Putting that worry aside for now, there remain far more pressing questions that the hardcopy industry
as a whole must consider. From my perspective, the egregious lapses that transpired at Xerox, then at OKI, next at Ricoh,
and then at Fuji Xerox reveal three disturbing tendencies.
First, we’ve witnessed excessive readiness by management to accept
unreasonably positive outcomes as evidence of superior operational performance. Second, we’ve seen a willingness by
executives to brush aside uncomfortable information when it’s conveyed by outsiders, from those in the field, or from
those who are lower down in the organization. And third, we’ve observed how an underlying current of desperation during
difficult times can cause leaders in effect to say “Don’t look a gift horse in the mouth.”
also seen the same tendencies play out in situations that didn’t involve fraud but still proved to be very detrimental.
Look no further than Xerox’s unwillingness to confront the big problems in its former BPO business; Lexmark’s
failure to realize it was overspending to buy underwhelming software firms; or the refusal by Dell or Panasonic or other vendors
to admit their total irrelevance to the hardcopy industry.
At a time when the industry and every hardcopy vendor must truly question
old assumptions, diversify in uncomfortable new ways, and pursue change sooner rather than later, it’s time now to consider
the lessons from this sordid history.
September 2017: “Buy, Buy EFI”
face it. We’re well into the “everybody needs somebody” stage in the printing industry. Acquisitions and
diversification are the name of the game. But consolidation is proceeding at a glacial pace. Vendors are more interested in
businesses that are further afield. That can be good news (Canon and medical) or bad news (Xerox and BPO). But there’s
a much closer-in company that hardcopy vendors are ignoring at their own peril as possible prey. And that company is EFI.
putting on my financial advisor hat. I don’t even own one. But what I am saying is that from a strategic, tactical and
competitive point of view, EFI could be a very logical acquisition for almost any print vendor around today.
Folks who think
of EFI mostly as that pricey Fiery supplier for color office and production MFPs might be surprised to know those RIPs are
rapidly declining in importance at EFI. Fiery generated just 27% of EFI’s revenue in the most recent quarter, and Fiery
revenue was flat in the first half of the year versus three years ago. It’s just that the rest of EFI has been growing
so much faster, both organically and from acquisitions.
As a result, 2017 is expected to be the year EFI finally surpasses a billion
dollars in revenue. The company now gets twice as much revenue from its diversified industrial inkjet hardware and supplies
business as compared to the Fiery business. The rest of EFI’s sales are from its vast collection of software used by
all sorts of print providers to run their day-to-day operations.
All three of EFI’s businesses present interesting
opportunities for hardcopy companies in the context of a would-be acquisition. Let’s start with the Fiery business,
since it’s the most familiar to MFP vendors. EFI is on track to do around $250 million in Fiery sales this year. And
with a 70% gross margin, the Fiery unit performs more like a software operation than a hardware business. Not only are Fiery
RIPs used by nearly every maker of A3 color MFPs, EFI has gradually expanded its Fiery sales into the world of digital presses
and inkjet devices, not to mention supporting its own diverse industrial printer lineup.
The benefits of a printer
vendor taking control of the Fiery business would be twofold. It would cut out the middleman and some markup, and it would
put all competitors at a worrisome disadvantage. And those other vendors couldn’t simply stop buying Fiery controllers.
They have no ready alternatives in the short term, and perhaps not even in the longer run. Over time, a new owner could even
create differentiation between the features in its own Fiery RIPs and those available to competitors. And a new owner would
be ideally positioned to leverage all that Fiery technology for its own industrial printers.
Then there’s EFI vast
and growing array of industrial inkjet and LED printers and supplies. It’s everything from signage and labels, to textiles
and tiles. And it should produce $600 million in sales this year. That’s a lot more than small industrial digital print
competitors like Xeikon, and it’s arguably more than any of the big diversified hardcopy companies are doing in the
industrial market. Adding EFI’s industrial printing revenue would catapult Xerox, Canon, HP or Konica Minolta to the
very top of the industrial print world.
And then there’s EFI’s easier-to-overlook “Productivity
Software” business, which will do around $150 million in sales this year. While this is EFI’s smallest business
by far, it does have the highest margins. More importantly, these tools put EFI in the enviable position of enabling industrial
print providers to go digital, and wedding them to an EFI print ecosystem.
There are also very important but less
quantifiable pluses for EFI as a potential acquisition. Both the company and its management are exceedingly well-known to
hardcopy vendors. Moreover, EFI has demonstrated an effective and reassuringly conservative ability to make one acquisition
after another ... and leverage them. The deals have mostly been small, and all of them were paid in cash. Yet EFI still had
$431 million in cash on June 30. There have been no big failures on the list, and all these deals have helped EFI grow 2.5x
in size since the Great Recession. Talk about reducing the risk in a deal.
Still, EFI remains barely a mid-cap
company in a stock market in which investors like large-cap firms. Moreover, one has to ask how truly disruptive or dominant
a company with $1 billion in sales across three businesses can be in a truly massive industrial printing market transition.
Of course, timing
can be everything, especially since EFI has an awkward history of pretty big swings in its stock price and valuation. For
the past five years, the stock has mostly bounced between $40 and $50. But this year, the stock has careened from a high of
$51, to a low of $26. A day after EFI scared the bejeezus out of investors on August 3, when it warned of revenue recognition
issues that turned out to be nothing, the stock plummeted 45%. That gave EFI a market cap of just $1.2 billion. By the end
of September, the share price was back up, pushing EFI’s valuation to $2 billion. But that’s still below a recent
peak of $2.3 billion back in April.
So who’s gonna open up the checkbook? You?
For very good reasons, there’s been more than a little handwringing
amongst hardcopy vendors, investors, analysts and others when it comes to figuring out if, when and how these companies will
proactively plan for their “next act.” The context is a printing industry that on an overall basis is slowly declining.
Understandably, the concerns are greatest for the largest vendors and for those vendors who are most dependent on printing
for their current revenue and profit.
I, too, have worried that I don’t see enough of these vendors taking sufficient
actions to create new businesses with adequate scale and financial attributes to offset the decline in printing. Eventually,
they’ll have to replace the bulk of what they get from printing. I see three plausible explanations for these vendors’
First, there’s the addictive nature of the supplies-and-service annuity business model. It’s
like asking why a drug addict doesn’t stash away some money for a rainy day. The second issue is the self-soothing way
vendors tend to believe all they need to do is gradually move into comfortably adjacent markets, whether that’s production
and industrial printing, or document management and IT services. They tell themselves the transition will be natural, comfortable,
uneventful. And the third and perhaps biggest roadblock is a combination of plain old fear and denial, plus a belief there’s
still plenty of time to plan.
But the past year has somewhat surprisingly provided evidence vendors are waking
up to the dangers and recognizing new possibilities. And some of them have decided their “next big thing” will
be healthcare. I’m not talking about healthcare as an interesting vertical in the world of printing, document management
or IT. No, I’m talking about horizontal healthcare as in medical equipment, allied software and services. You know,
the kind of healthcare that’s designed to help make people healthy ... or at least healthier.
In less than a year, we’ve
seen two top printing vendors make pretty important acquisitions that are likely to set them on paths that will make healthcare
an increasingly larger and transformative part of their respective businesses.
First, we saw Canon complete its $5.6
billion acquisition of Toshiba Medical Systems Corporation (TMSC) late last year. I’d like to think this reflected a
strategic awakening at Canon, but the deal was probably justified as much or more to help a fellow Japanese corporation in
dire financial straits, than to bolster Canon’s long nascent efforts in diagnostic medical devices. After all, Canon
had been talking about expanding further into healthcare for years, while giving no indication it planned to do anything that
was either tangible or timely. However, owning TMSC for just six months has worked wonders for Canon’s financial results.
It can’t be lost on management that TMSC is by far the best thing that’s happened to Canon’s financial health
in quite some time. So look out for even more deals.
Then a few weeks ago, we saw Konica Minolta announce its billion-dollar
purchase of US-based Ambry Genetics. It’s the biggest acquisition since Konica and Minolta came together in 2003, and
the most diversifying as well. Like Canon, Konica Minolta had been talking about expanding its tiny healthcare business for
some time without doing anything much to make that happen. Now, there’s a good chance Ambry will have the same kind
of fortuitous financial impact on Konica Minolta, and prove to be a strategic catalyst for additional healthcare investments.
not just these two hardcopy vendors who are making “healthy choices.” Consider that the company which had been
bidding most aggressively against Canon to buy TMSC was none other than Fujifilm, which owns three-quarters of Fuji Xerox.
Like Canon and Konica Minolta, Fujifilm already has a smallish medical business that it’s looking now to nurture and
Other hardcopy vendors’ plans are more aspirational. Sharp wants to use its display technologies
in the medical field. Kyocera already has a medical and dental division. Xerox PARC is partnering “to tackle healthcare
challenges through collaboration in medical technology, engineering and robotics.” And both HP and Funai have spoken
of leveraging their inkjet technologies for biomedical and pharmaceutical purposes.
There aren’t lots
of technological or even business synergies between printing and healthcare beyond some underlying commonality in optics and
digital imaging. The true impetus has much more to do with growth. Healthcare and allied medical fields will be among the
most dynamic and fast-growing sectors in the global economy in coming decades due to technological momentum and demographic
And I also see a healthy difference in the mindset hardcopy vendors are bringing to this field. In businesses
closer to office and production printing, hardcopy vendors display a distinct sense of unearned entitlement. It’s sort
of “Don’t you know who I am?” But with healthcare and medical technology being so much further afield and
also exceptionally dynamic, these vendors seem to sense they’ll actually have to earn everything they want. And that’s
a healthy choice.
July 2017: “Sure, We Can Do That”
Sometimes we Southern
Californians take for granted the inherent differences that come with living on the Left Coast, like year-round sunshine, great ethnic food, and day laborers. That last one refers
to the couple dozen immigrant workers in any Home Depot parking lot every day of the year. They’re new to the country
or down on their luck, and are willing to help with almost any task for a reasonable cash payment. It’s sort of like
the work I used to do as a kid for my dad ... except there was no cash payment.
to see the makings of an analogous trend in the US office MFP business. It’s too soon to say if
this development has legs, but it’s worth a look ... and some cautionary advice. What I’m talking about are a
couple of recent announcements from Ricoh and Konica Minolta. They’re about how both companies want to leverage their
MFP service people and infrastructure to pursue opportunities in new, not necessarily adjacent markets. My concern is that
these initiatives are very simplistic and not terribly sound.
In May, Ricoh announced Service Advantage, which
it described as a “substantial addition to its services suite.” The mission is “to help businesses accelerate
their core strengths” and “enable a significant competitive advantage.” To do this, Ricoh is offering a
wide range of businesses access to its global network of 25,000 skilled and certified service employees. Ricoh says they possess
“extensive market knowledge and distribution networks” and “understand the business conduct and laws”
in 200 countries and regions.
Ricoh boasts that its MFP service techs can provide “cradle-to-cradle”
services. That’s not babysitting, although I’m sure Ricoh would do that too for the right price. It’s just
another bit of undefined industry argot. Ricoh touts its expertise in device lifecycle management, distribution, installation,
maintenance, training, and physical asset retirement. But Ricoh never really pins down what exactly any of these services
are; how many or what kinds of employees provide the services; or any options for service delivery.
Then in June, Konica
Minolta announced it is investing up to $3 million in Knightscope, a Silicon Valley maker of security
robots. This follows a small initial investment in 2014. It’s the rationale that’s interesting. The focus isn’t
on robotics technology or the security market. Rather, it’s “to leverage Konica Minolta’s service technicians.”
The common thread
in what Ricoh and Konica Minolta have announced is a parallel quest to find new things for MFP service technicians to do.
When you break it down, the message is really pretty simple: “We have lots of service techs who do lots of stuff,
so why not let them do stuff for you?” We’re not talking here about MFP vendors advising other companies on service
infrastructure design, field service systems or software, or best service practices. This is about providing MFP service tech
bodies and hours far and wide so that other companies don’t have to hire, train, deploy and maintain service techs of
This type of offering is new in the MFP world, but the practice has a long history in the IT market. Today,
field service outsourcing is just another link in the booming logistics support and supply chain management business. In some
cases, it’s closely intertwined with IT outsourcing.
Now for the cautionary advice. Look back to the early days of field service
outsourcing in IT in the 1980s, and see who was doing it. And why. I stumbled across a “leaders” list IDC had
prepared over 30 years ago. It’s a veritable who’s who of old, largely forgotten mini and mainframe companies
like DEC, Prime, Data General, Tandem, Wang, Burroughs, Microdata, Basic Four, etc.
Now think back to what else
was happening in the ‘80s. The PC market was exploding, and these mini and mainframe computer companies were getting
slammed. They too had lots of service techs and were looking for a new way (or any way) to make money. Does this sound at
all familiar? Nearly all of them got into field service outsourcing, and it was a decent business ... for a while. But it
wasn’t enough to help most survive. In fact, only a few in that business managed to hang on (e.g., IBM, HP, Unisys,
Honeywell), and none of them still do field service outsourcing.
So this early interest among two MFP vendors who
want to leverage thousands of service techs warrants some critical thought. Let’s start with the most fundamental question.
Either these vendors have too many service techs; or they think their techs can easily take on totally new tasks; or they’re
expanding their service forces to gain new outsourcing work and customers. I have concerns with each of these scenarios.
needs are declining, which means fewer techs. If a vendor has too many techs, downsizing is the prudent choice. However, if
the idea is to build an outsourced service business, then the economics, competitive dynamics, prospects, and business model
for that endeavor deserve a harder look. Field service outsourcing faces a lot of pressure on pricing, margins and profits.
And the barriers to entry are hardly insurmountable. Ask Xerox about its experience with complementary services. Just because
a vendor can stretch the services it offers, does that mean it should?
June 2017: “Zis-Boom-Blah”
quite a while since I’ve editorialized about what it’s like to be a print industry analyst. The last time was
back in September 2010 (“That Raised Eyebrow”). Then, the introspection had been brought on by the untimely death
of a dear colleague. As I stated at the time, “No one likes to defend what he does for a living, least of all an analyst
who’s accustomed to examining others.” I also emphasized the value of “inherent and inerrant skepticism.”
As I said, “To be a thoughtful and well-grounded skeptic is the epitome of what it means to be a strong analyst.”
I still stand by those words.
But much has changed since then in printing, and more generally in the way people
today look at news and unvarnished analysis. In our own industry, too many vendors now act as if all they need to do is string
together trendy argot and add a few aspirational “change the world of work” statements. They equate those modest
efforts with actually delivering tangible news. And they look daggers at anyone who doesn’t drink their hardcopy Kool-Aid.
For some vendors, any contrary assessment that an analyst or a member of the press publishes is treated as if it were “fake
news” and a deep personal affront.
Here’s a case in point. I was recently admonished quite harshly by
a vendor for certain statements I had published months earlier about that company. The vendor complained long after my words
had appeared. Only now was I being told those words “were not necessarily interpreted as a token of trust or an interest
in building a good relationship.” If I knew it were a date, I would have brought flowers. I won’t say who the
vendor is as THAT wouldn’t really be newsworthy. In this instance, I choose to side with Shakespeare’s Henry IV.
“The better part of valor is discretion.”
And that wasn’t the worst of it. This wasn’t a case in which
the vendor actually disagreed with my assessment. Indeed, the vendor had long ago made very clear in a phone call that it
agreed with me completely. During the call, the vendor had told me other analysts and press people shared the same perspective.
But now, many months after the fact, I was informed the real problem was that I had had the temerity to express my views publicly
and in writing. Quelle horreur! I was to be punished because my feedback shouldn’t ever have gone beyond our call.
one to let sleeping dogs lie — especially not when there’s an opportunity to enlighten and to be snarky all at
the same time. Indeed, one of the few perks of publishing is getting to have the last word. So, I asked this vendor a simple
but telling question. Was his company equally offended and morally pained when on several occasions since that fateful commentary
I had dared to put in print certain genuinely positive and occasionally even glowing assessments of other things the same
company had done. The response? ... nothing but crickets.
And that’s precisely my point. I’m not here to be a cheerleader.
I don’t do rah-rah. Not for any vendor, not for the industry, not for a product category, not for a technology, not
for a particular channel, not for any program. Nor am I here to serve as a mere conduit. You know. You put your carefully
crafted “news” in one end, and wait to see it pop out from the other end. Nope. Not gonna do it.
and responsible executives have to understand they can’t have negative feedback shared quietly behind the scenes, with
only positive feedback deemed suitable for publishing.
In the abstract, I believe most vendors agree with me ... most of the time.
And all vendor certainly agree with me all of the time, as long as my critiques are focused on their competitors, or they
relate to a segment of the industry in which they don’t participate.
But as soon as I call YOUR baby ugly,
all hell breaks loose. And as often as not, it’s not really that your baby is ugly. It’s just that you’re
marketing and ability to communicate are lacking. You’ve failed to convey sufficient content and enough context in order
to persuade and enlighten me. And as I always tell vendors, if you can’t convince me, when I’m devoting time and
effort to understand what you’re saying, how are you ever going to use that same approach to win over customers or partners?
I’m you’re off-Broadway, out-of-town reviewer. Think ahead about how I’m going to react, take to heart what
I say, and act accordingly. It’s the things no one else bothers to tell you that will really hurt you.
vendors and their employees aren’t dumb or lazy or uncaring. And I know every company is under pressure to do more with
less and do it faster. But no other important constituency cares enough to dissect what you’re doing.
going to change. I’m too old and cranky, and I’m way too cynical to move toward lighter and brighter. I’m
gonna keep saying things — sometimes mean and hurtful things. I’ll criticize you when I understand you, but I
don’t agree with you. I’ll explain why I don’t agree. Then you decide if you disagree with me. You’re
free (even encouraged) to pick apart my rationale for disagreeing. Whether you share that with me isn’t the point. It
will make you a better vendor. It’s the circle of life ... or at least it’s how I think life should be for an
industry analyst like me. Rah!.
May 2017: “In Search of Goldilocks”
There are some
big similarities between where hardcopy vendors should look to go from here, and the ongoing quest by astronomers to locate
habitable planets somewhere out in the universe. MFP industry executives and stargazers alike are focused on identifying what’s
known as the “Goldilocks Zone” — not too near and not too far, not too hot and not too cold. Everyone is
anxiously seeking a new place that’s just right.
In astronomy, that means pursuing rocky planets in the so-called habitable
zone. They’re not too big or small and not too close or far from their star. Temperature and atmospheric pressure there
coincide to maintain liquid surface water.
And in the hardcopy universe, logic and experience prescribe an equally
narrow habitable zone. Those new business opportunities must lie adjacent to the company’s current print technology
or leverage its current business practices. And that basically points toward two options.
A vendor can use its inkjet
technology to move into industrial printing. It can be anything, from labels and packaging, to signage and wall coverings,
to textiles and ceramics, and even additive manufacturing. Because high-speed, high-quality inkjet printing is a complex and
narrowly held technology, there are pretty good barriers to entry. And one also shouldn’t underestimate the comfort
factor for vendors who want to stay in the “printing” business. So it’s not surprising that industrial inkjet
printing is becoming the preferred path. But there’s not room for everyone.
The alternative is to make the big
leap from managed print services in the office, to a more broadly — but not too broad or distant — set of services
for workflow, business process improvement, or managed IT. While demand exists for all of these varied kinds of services,
the risks are pretty high when expanding into these new arenas. Above all, one can’t just ignore all the competitors
who didn’t come from the hardcopy world, as MFP vendors have been wont to do.
And just as astronomers
have found that being even a little bit outside the Goldilocks Zone has profound implications for the chances of life to exist,
so too do the odds of business success appear to dissipate rapidly the further vendors in our industry stray from their core
For better or worse, the experiences over the past half-decade at Xerox with BPO services and at Lexmark
with ECM software have closed the doors on areas that initially had seemed quite reasonable to pursue. It doesn’t matter
now if one argues the real problem was Xerox’s or Lexmark’s management, the companies they acquired, or the prices
they paid. No reasonable investor or lender is ever going to fund a repeat.
Even if one puts aside these two particular
failed efforts to buy one’s way into a diversified future, there are other examples playing out among top hardcopy companies
today that have nothing to do with recent acquisitions. And what they show is that different is not always synonymous with
better. Look no further than HP’s ordeals in the PC market, or Canon’s huge problems with cameras, or even the
obstacles confronting Toshiba TEC in the POS business. Not only is each of these product domains fraught with challenges,
they all have much worse profitability than the hardcopy business.
Yes, I know it’s easier for me to cajole,
caution and criticize vendors than it is for those companies who are dependent on the printing business to make such a huge
leap. At the same time, I just don’t see a lot of other options. Most vendors who choose not to move toward industrial
printing or a broader services portfolio are left only with different versions of what amounts to giving up.
Sure, a weak
or small printing vendor can try to sell itself to a larger or stronger one. But this is really just doubling down on print.
One better hope the buyer is doing a better job planning for the future than the seller did. Yet this is also the most likely
outcome for several vendors today.
Or a vendor may be able to sell itself to an investment firm in what amounts to
nothing more than a financial transaction devoid of interest in technology or products. The buyer will gut R&D; slash
administrative and operational costs; perhaps undercut the competition on price; suck off the profits for five or so years
in order to make the deal pay off; and then let the doors close.
Or a vendor might try to find some IT-oriented
buyer who sees value in a high-touch direct and indirect B2B sales and support operation. Perhaps a printer company can be
rejiggered and redeployed in another product or services domain. But such buyers are bound to be few. And given the high degree
of risk, the price a vendor would obtain in such a deal is likely to be low.
The only other option is really nothing
more than the default choice. It’s a non-decision decision to stay the course. No vendor is ever going to admit that’s
the plan. But the financial results we’re seeing today tend to indicate this is indeed what’s happening inside
many firms. They’re still talking about change and transformation and plans and finally “getting it.” But
they’re really just hoping for a very gentle decline in the printing business over an extended period of time —
preferably until management is able to retire.
April 2017: “Easy, Breezy, Beautiful ... And Altogether
When assessing an MFP product launch, I often tell vendors my simple rule of thumb. If I - an experienced
and admittedly compulsive analyst - have a hard time finding a reasonable level of detail on your products, what does that
mean for customers who have far better things to do with their time?
Based on what I've experienced over the past
couple of months, there's been a definite downward trend in what vendors seem able or willing to provide. I'm left
to conclude there's a concerted effort among the industry's leading companies to obfuscate when it comes to their
new products. Tell me. How is this supposed to help sales?
The latest examples I've encountered are quite literally the biggest
MFP vendor announcements in recent memory: HP's massive new A3 product launch; Epson's pagewidth inkjet A3 device
news; Xerox's big WorkCentre-to-AltaLink upgrade; and Konica Minolta's Workplace Hub debut. In each case, the announcement
and the follow-through have been sadly subpar, to the point where I wonder if many customers will even bother trying to figure
out what's going on.
There have to be some common reasons for the consistent bungling and missed opportunities. It's not
a coincidence. So here's my take on the top seven causes - and by implication the remedies - for these major marketing
Consumerization. Bringing consumer products and technologies into business isn't a bad thing, but
the misapplication of consumer marketing norms does a huge disservice to the office MFP industry. What I call the CoverGirl
approach - easy, breezy, beautiful - has unfortunately become all too common in the business IT world. The focus has shifted
to flavor, feeling and fluff at the expense of facts and functionality. Connect the damn dots! It's not a marketing win
when an analyst or would-be customer listens to your big pitch and walks away thinking, "That's nice, but what is
it this company's really delivering?"
The Two-Step. In each of the examples I cited, the vendor opted for
a big emphasis on the pre-shipment launch and a much more vague postpartum promise that the details would follow. But just
as in Hollywood, a sequel is never as good as the original. There can certainly be good reasons for
announcing products months prior to their availability. But those reasons should never include a desire to delay final collateral,
setting prices, determining messages, and fine-tuning everything else. Vendors have to be able to maintain a sense of urgency,
even after the excitement of the pre-announcement fades.
The Big Picture. Somehow office imaging companies
has convinced themselves their mission is only to solve their customers' absolute biggest problems. It's all about
security and workflow and mobility and content and cloud and happiness and world peace and on and on. As a result, it doesn't
seem to occur to vendors any longer that they still have to excel at the basics, like speeds, features, options, economics,
configurations. It's clarity on the details that enables buyers to accept those loftier promises.
Doubt. I'm convinced
a lot of the dysfunctional marketing I see these days around MFP product announcements can be traced back a fundamental but
uncomfortable truth. Vendors don't really believe their own hype any more. It comes down either to believing more or hyping
less. I'm convinced the best way to bridge the gap is for vendors to do a better job providing details and explaining
features that deliver real upside to customers. And that includes those pesky pecuniary facts called prices!
is the French word for boredom. But it connotes more than that ... a certain weariness, fatigue and apathy with a whiff of
wistfulness and a soupcon of sadness. Increasingly, I think the lack of depth and completeness in MFP announcements can be
attributed to vendors who deep down believe there's really nothing new, interesting, important or different in what they're
bringing to market. And all that fosters a certain laxity when it comes to satisfying the basic requirements of marketing.
Meanwhile, I suspect vendors tell themselves it's really about a lack of resources and too few personnel.
All too often too many vendors behave as if there's some other group down the line that will compensate for their own
marketing shortcomings. Offshore vendors look to their regional sales companies to do the job; marketing pushes the task onto
sales; and vendors assume channel partners will pick up the slack. But too often, the buck stops before it gets there.
in some of the reluctance among vendors to perform what used to be considered marketing basics is an irrational fear that
such information "will only help my competitors." News flash! ... Your competitors already know this stuff or they
will very soon, regardless of what you do or don't do. So does it really make sense to hobble the ability of your customers
and prospects (and analysts and press) to fully appreciate what you've got out of some misguided hope you're impeding
As the saying goes, "You only get one chance to make a first impression." So stop screwing it
2017: “Are These the Good Old Days?”
I’m not one who recalls lots of famous
lines from TV shows or movies and sprinkles them in my conversation. However, there’s a line from the 2013 finale of
The Office — the US version — that’s particularly apropos to one segment of the MFP
business today. It’s when Andy Bernard laments, "I wish there was a way to know you're in the good old days
before you've actually left them."
No, I haven’t gone all sappy. Hardcopy today is far from “rainbows
and unicorns,” but it’s dawned on me that we’re on the cusp of what can legitimately be looked at as “the
golden age of desktop MFPs.” To clarify, I’m talking about economical A4 laser or LED color and monochrome MFPs
sold in open channels. And it’s more about what users get from these “low-end” MFPs than any claim these
products are creating the best of times financially for those who make them.
To see what I mean, look no further
than some of the products noted in this issue, particularly the color devices: Canon’s new imageCLASS models;
Brother’s latest MFC series; and Xerox’s first VersaLink MFPs. HP is no slouch in this category either, but these
latest products are now a step ahead. Lexmark also remains a contender, but one with some issues. You might put OKI in this
category, too, although less so when it comes to scale and viability. And with the imminent departure of Samsung-designed
MFPs in this segment, that’s pretty much it. Six vendors in a market that can probably support three or four with a
reasonable degree of success.
Certainly in relative terms, the A4 side of the MFP business is where the unit
volume and sales growth are to be found these days, especially for color devices. Meanwhile, we’re seeing most traditional
A3 vendors pretty much give up on true A4 innovation and promotion. They’ve concluded — probably correctly —
there’s no way to be an A4 evangelist without exacerbating already tenuous sales trends in the more lucrative A3 side
of the business. Is it any wonder just two vendors (Lexmark and Kyocera) offer today’s only fully credible A3 replacement-type
But forget about the vendor side of the equation for a moment. Instead, look at what customers get from
the latest crop of mostly sub-$1,000 A4 laser MFPs ... which they can buy instantly at dozens of places online, have UPS or
FedEx deliver to their door, and be using tomorrow.
As much as the industry has come to denigrate ”speeds and feeds,”
who doesn’t like faster better than slower? Today’s latest desktop MFPs offer color speeds in the range of 30-55
ppm and some monochrome models are up to 65 ppm. Nor is it just output speed. New single-pass duplex document feeders are
enabling image capture at 20 ipm on up to 60 ipm on most models.
And vendors are at last getting serious about
paper-handling. Not only is duplex a given for both input and output, a paper supply north of 1,000 sheets is hardly unusual.
Even though most engines are still front-facing printer designs, today’s new machines are compact and require modest
space. They’re easy to fit almost anywhere and relocate as needed.
Arguably the greatest progress has
been in usability. No longer are big touchscreens limited to pricey A3 devices and consumer AIOs. Color touchscreens
on new laser MFPs measure up to 7”, and vendors are enabling tablet-style gestures and features. These enhanced UI’s
are providing the basis for more powerful customization and personalization, user-defined workflows, downloadable apps, and
simple but powerful solutions. Likewise, vendors are providing more and better tools for device management and MPS.
aren’t yet getting enough credit for how they’re quietly but significantly bringing down page costs, albeit from
levels that used to be downright embarrassing. There’s still more room for improvement on color pages, but monochrome
costs are now pretty attractive. Across the board, vendors are offering more toner choices, and many of the new cartridges
have unprecedented high yields. And keep in mind, these savings come without restricted access to supplies and without any
need for a service contract ... unless that’s what one wants.
So what are the missing pieces? A few things come
to mind, but I’d categorize them as making a good thing even better. On the product side, simple finishers would be
a nice plus. That would be facilitated by the addition of more sideways print engines. And I’m still holding out hope
for more A3-capable A4 products like Ricoh’s easy-to-overlook (apparently even for them) monochrome MP305 Plus. And
we’re still lacking a toner program like HP’s Instant Ink. HP piloted a “professional” version of
its inkjet supplies replenishment program in 2014, but nothing came of it. And while other vendors offer automated toner shipment
programs, none yet has the simplicity or economy of Instant Ink.
Nonetheless, as these final improvements
begin to hit the market — as they undoubtedly will — they’ll quell some of the last blanket arguments in
favor of A3 models for lots of SMB customers and for many enterprise workgroups. But even without additional improvements,
you still won’t find a more robust and innovative MFP segment today than the A4 desktop business. So enjoy it
2017: “Runts of the Litter”
t’s one of those cold, hard facts of animal life. There’s
often a runt or two in a litter of newborn dogs or cats. They can be cute and they may yet thrive, but the odds are stacked
against runts from the get-go, and their early disadvantageous circumstances are hard to ever fully overcome.
Sadly, the same
holds true for hardcopy vendors. Back in the beautiful, bountiful days of yore — when there was plenty of business to
go around — runts could manage to hang on, perhaps exploit a particular niche, and work assiduously to stay out of the
way of their bigger brethren. But those kinds of lives are increasingly difficult to maintain in a printing business that
has peaked and now faces an unknown rate of decline.
Survival of the fittest dictates one of two possible outcomes for hardcopy
runts. Either they’re sufficiently attractive to be bought, although perhaps at less-than-ideal prices, or they’ll
simply exit. The latter process will be abrupt for some; others may linger on a few years, slashing expenses and milking the
supplies and service annuity. But we’re beyond the point where spunk, grit or wishful thinking will save the day.
So who are these
printing runts? Sadly, it’s a growing list that includes practically every vendor that falls below a certain hardcopy
revenue bar. And I’d argue that bar keeps moving higher.
There are common threads among those on the list.
None is highly diversified in print. Each has a fundamental technological limitation, whether that’s laser vs. inkjet,
color vs. mono, A4 vs. A3. Most are focused narrowly on a particular sales channel. Some rely heavily on OEM suppliers or
are themselves focused on OEM sales. Others have surprisingly narrow geographic coverage. While it may be counterintuitive,
the majority have been doing what they’re doing in print for a very long time. And more often than not, they’re
small pieces of larger entities.
Let’s start with the two most recent guests at the printer party, Pantum
and Funai. Neither offers anything distinctive in terms of products or technology. They’ve made no real headway in a
particular channel, category or geography. And they’re abysmal marketers. Plugging away a few more years won’t
change any of that. Buh-bye.
And you can put Avision in almost the same category. It’s halfheartedly tried
to leverage a background in scanners and offshore manufacturing to create a couple of midrange A3 and A4 mono laser MFPs that
no other vendor or customer has shown an inkling to OEM or buy.
Casio is unique, but not in a good way.
It’s made a few OK-ish A3 color LED print engines, but its OEM business has dried up. It’s also the only printer
vendor anywhere with no MFPs, and it sells its Speedia line of printers only in Japan.
NEC. The one-time would-be contender has scaled back its printing presence again and again such that today it OEM’s
just a few models from Fuji Xerox and sells them only in Japan. It’s time to say goodbye for good.
Lenovo is a
big company and a dominant PC player, but the collection of rebadged mostly mono A4 models it sells only in China have nothing
to recommend them. And a development project with Ricoh has been a disappointment. This company has much bigger fish to fry.
in the same sort of leaky PC boat. Its big printing dreams of a decade ago have dwindled down to me-too OEM’d models
in the US and Canada. It’s past the time to admit
defeat and move on.
Also due for a dose of reality is Panasonic. Just when you think they finally get it, the company
launches a half-dozen more A4 monochrome laser MFPs that get a few sales in a smattering of markets, but not in the US. Printing and Panasonic haven’t been a match for over a decade.
OKI is somewhat better off,
but this vendor too needs to accept it will be perpetually in the third tier. However, it’s among the few on my list
that could extract at least some kind of modest price in a sale to the right A3-centric MFP vendor.
The slow-motion demise of
Muratec in printing is getting harder to watch. Clearly, being a nice company with nice people that treat others nicely isn’t
enough. Fortunately, the company is involved in a half-dozen much better businesses.
Olivetti is the last of
the full-line MFP relabellers. It offers no differentiation and few solutions, selling through tiny dealers in a handful of
mostly European countries. And it generates about 1% of Telecom Italia’s revenue. Arrivederci!
Rounding out my list are
two wanna-be production inkjet vendors. RISO is gradually shifting from outdated duplicators to mediocre presses, but the
future looks far from rosy. Then there’s Memjet, which has spent an obscene amount of other people’s money, with
very little to show for it. It’s time to give up and sell off.
And while Sharp and Toshiba aren’t officially
on my watch list, it’s hard not to worry about their futures. At least these MFP operations should command OK prices
from buyers someday.
January 2017: “2017? It's Gonna be Yuge!”
It looks like Washington isn’t the only place this year where braggadocio and bombast are back with a vengeance. For separate but similar
reasons, HP and Xerox want to make 2017 yuge for the MFP industry and for themselves. Each is seeking to foment its own “MAGA”
moment in a declining global office printing business dominated by not-so-American makers. Time will tell if these latest
hardcopy histrionics will pan out.
There was blood in the water as each vendor nervously sought to convince
itself, its customers and its investors the other guy was wrong and destined to fail. But HP and Xerox were so obsessed with
their own challenges, they underestimated Japanese vendors, and both companies ended up suffering as a result.
HP set the stage for 2017 when it announced plans to disrupt the “copier” market — a term every other vendor
stopped using in the last millennium — by reinventing and replacing service-intensive boxes with superior multifunction
printers based largely on failed Samsung devices. That crusade will commence this spring with the launch of sixteen A3-size
laser and inkjet MFPs that will available in 54 specific configurations that differ mostly in terms of their bundled paper-handling
Not to be outdone, Xerox at its Wall Street investor conference in early December stated it would launch
29 new MFPs in mid-2017, which is more models than HP but fewer SKUs. Xerox said it will be “the largest new product
launch in its history.” We’ll bide our time to see how really new these A3 and A4 MFPs actually are. Xerox has
been milking the same old B&W A3 platform for 15 years, and its last “new” MFPs were differentiated only by
a tiny firmware tweak and the addition of an “i” after the old model numbers.
Assuming the numbers of
new devices are real and the launches happen as planned, HP and Xerox this year will add more models than any other MFP vendor
launched last year, in some cases 50% to over 100% more new products.
Of course, one mustn’t overlook the fact
HP and Xerox are facing some pretty tough headwinds that have been far from kind to their respective hardcopy operations of
late, albeit in somewhat different ways. Also not a coincidence is that this latest last-man-standing battle over office MFPs
is being waged after both companies have shed major parts of their respective business empires that until very recently each
vendor had portrayed as being the epitome of synergy.
Likewise, the ultimate attraction — but also the Achilles heel
— for the upcoming MFP salvos at HP and Xerox has more to do with channel than product or technology. By my count, this
latest A3 push at HP will be that company’s seventh concerted effort to ignore, obsolete, or co-opt office equipment
dealers. And Xerox’s newest pitch to those same dealers caps 20 years of yearning, learning, burning and churning that
have yielded precious few gains. But Xerox calls it a “greenfield opportunity.”
all these new models are to be so beautiful and really great. HP and Xerox this time promise to succeed bigly where every
previous push has faltered. Just ask them. But don’t ask for lots of details. That would spoil the surprise. Anyway,
details are for losers. Winners are happy with vision.
According to Xerox, channel partners “have always wanted our A3 products,”
which somehow ignores the fact its MFPs have been there for the taking for years. And Xerox also says dealers have great confidence
it will be here for the long haul. OK, if you say so. And HP is sticking with its “performance of copiers with the reliability
and ease-of-use of printers” bloviating. Good thing we’ve never heard that one before.
Still, if I were a betting
man — and I have to say I’m not — it would appear the odds are not in favor of either HP or Xerox succeeding,
or succeeding as fully and fantastically as they need to in order to satisfy their impatient investors. So sad. Dealers are
sticky, risk averse, and rightly focused on other priorities these days. Even if those new MFPs do all HP and Xerox are trying
to convince the world they can do, it’s far from clear these vendors won’t just end up running faster to stay
in the same place, while they hunt for an elusive future less dependant on print.
One of the biggest unintended consequences
could easily be that Xerox and HP once again sharpen their foci obsessively and narrowly on themselves, leaving Ricoh, Canon,
Konica Minolta, Sharp and Toshiba to keep on doing what they’ve been doing, which is to dominate selling and servicing
of office MFPs, and then use that as a springboard for their cautiously gradual expansion into adjacent opportunities.
Believe me ...
that’s what people are saying.