From the January 2020 Issue - “The Opportunity of a Lifetime?"
The most unlikely coincidences can sometimes prove fortuitous for all concerned. In the MFP world, look no further than what’s previously been the nonintersecting paths of Japan’s Fujifilm and regional dealer roll-ups around the US. It turns out these companies in 2020 could be the best thing that ever happened to each other.
The catalyst is what’s just occurred at Fujifilm. All of the attention in recent months on Xerox simultaneously disengaging from Fuji Xerox and going after HP has largely ignored what these events means for Fujifilm. But now we know. Fujifilm has informed Xerox it won’t renew the long-standing agreement that governed where in the world they could sell their products.
Xerox seems to have been caught off guard and has said very little about what it plans to do, but Fujifilm has been crystal clear. It plans to sell its popular range of MFPs, printers and presses — many of which also Xerox OEMs since it has so little product development capability of its own — on a global basis starting next April 1 in 2021.
But there’s one big hitch in the planned entry of Fujifilm Business Innovation into the Americas and EMEA regions. The company has zero sales footprint in these territories, and it needs to go from nowhere to everywhere in less than fifteen months. By my way of thinking, the easiest and best way for Fujifilm to do that in the US is to buy several of these all-dressed-up-but-nowhere-to-go regional megadealers. Or at the very least, Fujifilm needs to go woo, train, support and perhaps subsidize several regional powerhouses.
At first glance, this approach looks very one-sided. But Fujifilm isn’t the only one out there in MFP land that needs help. We all know there’s been a big increase in private equity and professional investment funding for MFP dealer acquisitions and consolidation. Look no further than companies like FlexPrint, Visual Edge, Marco and UBEO. Even Staples’ purchase of DEX fits this pattern. And there are several good-size self-funded dealers that are also doing lots of M&A, like Kelley, EO Johnson, RJ Young and Office1.
Especially with professional investors, the time comes when one must pay the piper. That’s typically in 4-7 years. Regional hardcopy dealers or IT services providers aren’t likely to go public, so that means selling the business to someone else. That could be a manufacturer, another investor, a business on the periphery of office printing, or another megadealer with really big aspirations.
As I editorialized back in September (“Irrational Exuberance”), these professional money people are buying good or even great dealers that already outperform their peers. And while these dealers have proven adept at serving yesterday’s shrinking MFP market, they’re in the very early stages of reinventing themselves for tomorrow’s less-print world. So I struggle to see a path or a time frame for a huge payoff for all of this private investment in the MFP dealer business.
But now here comes Fujifilm! While generally ignored in the US since the collapse of the film business more than a decade ago, Fujifilm has pretty much done the right kinds of things, while Kodak did almost everything wrong. So today Fujifilm is a company with roughly $21.7 billion in worldwide sales, $3.7 billion in net income, and $4.2 billion in cash in the bank.
Via the soon-to-be-rechristened Fuji Xerox, Fujifilm is doing about $9 billion in hardcopy revenue this year. That’s a bit more than 40% of its business, and print contributes over half of Fujifilm’s operating income.
Fujifilm spending $2.2 billion to buy out Xerox’s stake in Fuji Xerox and then announcing it will let its global agreement with Xerox lapse next spring says this company is serious about expanding into the US hardcopy market very soon with its own brand and its own products. And that indicates Fujifilm has both the need and the means to get really busy really quickly buying and/or building out a US sales channel.
The good news is that, unlike many of its hardcopy competitors, Fujifilm has a successful M&A track record. Most of its deals have been to diversify beyond printing and film, although Fujifilm will close shortly on its nearly $100 million purchase of CSG, which is Australia’s largest MFP dealer. That’s a good sign for big US dealers.
I’d argue as well that if Fujifilm is to have any shot at success in the US office MFP business, it won’t be able to follow the slow sign-up paths taken by other newcomers, like Lexmark, HP, Epson or Samsung. The stakes are too high and the market is too mature now, so time is of the essence. That bodes well for forging a new path.
It simply isn’t feasible for Fujifilm to sign a couple hundred or so local dealers across the US and/or build out a comprehensive direct sales operation. To me, that leaves just one approach. Fujifilm needs to buy multiple regional megadealers to obtain quick and capable national coverage. It can fill in the rest with distribution by signing up a smaller number of mostly larger dealers. Unless Fujifilm does this, I predict it will ultimately fail in the US MFP business. A presumably motivated vendor-buyer plus presumably motivated dealer-sellers? That could be exciting!!
From the December 2019 Issue - “Introducing Bissett's Law"
It was my younger son — a would-be international policy wonk — who introduced me a few years ago to Godwin’s Law. This simple Internet adage was first put forth back in 1990, and it was included in the Oxford English Dictionary in 2012. Godwin’s Law holds that in any online discussion of a topic, someone sooner or later will compare something or someone else to Hitler. And a key corollary to Godwin’s Law is that once the discussion has degenerated to the “Hitler” level, productive discourse has ceased.
What I’m calling Bissett’s Law is analogous. It holds that any discussion of the fate of a printing or imaging vendor will ultimately degenerate into some kind of cautionary comparison to Kodak, and how that ignominious company’s downfall was obviously foreseeable, easily avoidable, and likely to be repeated by the company in question. My aspirations for Bissett’s Law are admittedly humble but still highly relevant within the confines of the hardcopy world.
The most recent invoker of Bissett’s Law is Carl Icahn. The controversial shareholder activist played the Kodak card in 2018 when he railed against Xerox’s proposed sale to Fujifilm, and he used it again in December when castigating HP for its disinterest in being acquired by Xerox. But Icahn is hardly alone. Others have directed the “you’ll end up like Kodak” scold at companies as diverse as Intel, Cummins, Proctor & Gamble and Hilton. It’s the business equivalent of Mom yelling, “You’re gonna put your eye out with that thing!”
But what should one — especially one coming from the printing world — actually take away from Kodak’s sad history of decline and failure? My admittedly far from exhaustive list of lessons includes the following ten cautions that are especially relevant to hardcopy vendors today.
1. Success breeds contempt. Kodak wasn’t blind. It saw the massive disruption coming its way from digital photography. But Kodak felt arrogantly entitled to dominate that successor market with its digital cameras and inkjet printers, and to bend the business model to suit its needs.
2. Big changes are seldom slow or steady. While Kodak saw the writing on the wall for film, it believed the change would be slow and linear, playing out over ten to twenty years. But in reality, once a big technological transition gets underway, it happens a lot faster than expected.
3. A big flawed acquisition can be disastrous. Kodak looked to pharmaceuticals as one of its vague ideas for diversification, so it bought a troubled Sterling Pharmaceutical in 1988 for $5.1 billion. That was triple Sterling’s revenue and equal to almost 40% of Kodak’s revenue. But Kodak ended up selling Sterling in pieces within just a few years for half what it had paid. And it was the last big deal Kodak was ever able to do.
4. Little deals yield tiny results. Kodak also bought a string of small technology companies between 2003 and 2008, but they did little for its sales or profit. And Kodak had no effective ideas or means to leverage those investments so as to create its next big thing.
5. Adjacent opportunities are further than you think. Finding a market close to one’s current business is never as easy or obvious as it sounds. And adjacent markets often have different business models and their own dominant incumbents, as Kodak found out with digital cameras and inkjet printers.
6. Technological adjacency matters more. A company that’s built its business and reputation on a solid technological foundation, will have better luck finding new uses for its core IP and R&D expertise than by looking for quick and easy ways to exploit current customers or sales channels. Look back at Fujifilm instead of Kodak.
7. The next big thing may well have very different financial dynamics. Kodak kept seeking cookie-cutter replacements for the film business and couldn’t wrap its mind around the idea of having to adjust to new business models and to very different financial norms in new arenas.
8. Hiring an outsider CEO is no easy answer. New blood and fresh ideas can quite possibly be good, but an accomplished outsider CEO with little in-house credibility or with an agenda of his own is seldom the solution for a company that’s used to domination in its own troubled world.
9. Stock buybacks can’t build a future. During a dozen years starting in the mid-1990s, Kodak spent over $5 billion to buy its own stock. And the company still planned to buy back up to 25% of its shares as late as 2008. But Kodak desperately needed that money to build or buy a way to diversify and thrive in a post-film world.
10. Every brand has a life span. The bruised, battered and bankrupted Kodak name is still one of the 100 most recognizable US brands. ... So what! That’s meant diddly for Kodak’s ability to survive or deliver tangible value to the market.
To its credit, one wrong-headed thing Kodak did not do was to double down on the old film business. Kodak never tried to purchase Fujifilm. And Fujifilm had the good sense not to try and buy a waning Kodak. Would that Xerox’s current leadership had the same foresight vis-á-vis HP today.
From the November 2019 Issue - “High Apple Pie in the Sky Hope!"
Prepare for a rant. This issue of The MFP Report was tough to write. As much as many readers might think I relish my role as a print industry curmudgeon and all-purpose doomsayer, I’m more than that guy who likes to say “No!” But I’m just tired of printer vendors whose so-called strategies and plans are the business equivalent of Frank Sinatra singing “High Hopes” in a forgettable flick from the year I was born. That’s the song about “that little old ant” and the treacly chorus goes, “But he's got high hopes, he's got high hopes. He's got high apple pie, in the sky hopes.”
It’s not me who’s changed for the worse. It’s the industry. Two-dozen years ago this month, when I produced the very first issue of The MFP Report, what I enjoyed most was the excitement and optimism of the era. It was all about how fast analog copiers and fax machines and single-function printers were going to morph into this booming business of powerful MFPs and fancy AIOs. These changes were driving amazing expansion in an already growing world of print.
Not every vendor succeeded, and not every product was a winner. But companies worked amazingly hard to grow even faster and to jockey for position. Despite the overriding optimism, vendors were generally cautious and almost always diligent. Their strategies, plans and tactics were surprisingly detailed and grounded in reality. Fluffy slogans, fatuous promises, and unachievable targets tended to be the exception.
Not so today. More often than not, hardcopy companies can barely elucidate a “what” in their superficial business plans. You can pretty much forget about anything that might resemble a “how.” And don’t even bother looking for a “how much” or a “how long” or a “what if.” Who needs those boring niceties, when instead companies can talk about workflow and business transformation, about cloud and subscriptions, about IoT and AI, and about digital first and synergies?
These are the things that drive me absolutely batty. OK, I’ll be the first to acknowledge that I’m an inveterate skeptic. By the way, that’s quite different than being a cynic. I simply and quite rightfully expect that the high-paid executive talent placed at the helms of multibillion-dollar public printing companies should do as good a job as pimply teenagers on a high school debate team when it comes to arguing a point, defending their actions, and winning over naysayers.
I think part of what’s changed is the nature of being an executive in a large public company these days. Humble is definitely out. One must always pretend to have the answers. And all that matters are the next few quarters. So forget about innovation, temporary sacrifice, and building long-term value. Executives — as much as their companies — are all about building a brand and gaining attention. So messages have to be short, catchy and cool. Who cares if nearly every sound bite from nearly every company in a particular industry sounds nearly identical, and is devoid of anything like meaningful content?
Look no further than the stories in this month’s issue of The MFP Report to see what I mean. Vendors miss their quarterly numbers, but somehow they say they’ll hit their annual targets. Fujifilm spends billions on a printing deal but swears its core strategy is to diversify. Xerox waves a magic wand and poof ... there are oodles of imaginary MFP suppliers to replace bad old Fuji Xerox. And Xerox will also borrow a measly $25 billion to combine two troubled printing businesses and a mature PC business. What could go wrong? Then there’s Ricoh. After bombing with subscriptions for six years, the company swears the third time will be the charm. Konica Minolta and Workplace Hub? ... nuff said. There’s also Epson. No, it’s not the slim product line, the lack of dealers, or the absence of any raison d’être for joining the A3 office business that are problematic. It’s that customers don’t know how cool (literally rather than figuratively) Epson’s MFPs are.
This is what what the majority of hardcopy vendors have been doing for too many years. Every month implicitly they’re presuming we’re gullible or incapable of thinking, as they explicitly put forth tenuous claims that defy logic and have little grounding in fact or reality. Please, don’t serve us poo and call it chocolate pudding!
So is there any hope for hardcopy vendors? For the printing industry? Or for crotchety old me? Being the skeptic that I am, I’m really not sure. What I do know is that nothing will change until people — dealers, customers, financiers, partners, press and analysts — push back much harder and demand a lot more. Hardcopy companies and their leaders aren’t stupid, but they are scared and rightfully so. Vendors have reacted by simultaneously becoming too risk averse and too willing to make crazy moves that have little chance of succeeding. It’s a real conundrum.
Above all, I worry about the glaring sense of entitlement that’s implicit in the “plans” and “strategies” of too many hardcopy companies today. Yup, printing is a tough business, but so are lots of other industries. Hardcopy vendors need to earn the right to take sales from current competitors, create entirely new markets, or enter existing spaces. I wanna see a lot less high apple pie in the sky, and a lot more humble pie.
From the October 2019 Issue - “3D Goes from Fad to Dud"
There’s an axiomatic inverse relationship between breathless media attention in a particular new area of the IT world, and the revenue coming from that industry segment. All that early buzz causes lots of tangential IT companies to look for ways to glom onto a new trend. However, by the time that new IT business shows appreciable growth and delivers more significant revenue, those wanna-bes and the IT intelligentsia have already moved on to the next “next big thing.” And that’s the story of hardcopy vendors and 3D printing over the past half-decade.
Think back to 2014. 3D printing was all the rage in our supposedly adjacent world of laser and inkjet output, which in strangely relativistic terms was being called “2D printing.” Over the next year or two, MFP vendors in the US and elsewhere rushed to announce reseller deals with 3D printer makers. And MFP vendors like HP, Canon, Ricoh, Sindoh and Olivetti — and even tiny YSoft — previewed, promised or promoted an array of homegrown 3D print devices, from high-end to low-end. But fast forward just five years, and oh how things have changed.
The 3D printing market is doing very well, thank you. Wohlers Associates, which has been the top research firm in the field for 24 years, released its latest market data this past spring. They reported global 3D product, supplies and services revenue rose 34% in 2018 to just shy of $10 billion. That was more than triple the revenue in 2013, right before hardcopy vendors started getting all hot and bothered about the space. Wohlers also highlighted a 31% increase in the number of industrial 3D printer vendors last year, along with record (>40%) growth in sales of 3D print consumables. And Wohlers is forecasting 3D revenue will hit $35 billion in 2024.
Meanwhile, the number of hardcopy vendors developing or reselling 3D printers has plummeted. 3D barely warrants a mention these days in the plans, events or diversification strategies of most MFP companies. Those high-end products from Ricoh and Canon are more conceptual that remunerative. And the desktop models from Sindoh, Olivetti and YSoft are barely noticed. Likewise, only a tiny minority of dealers are actively selling 3D printers, and almost none sees that market as a real path toward diversification.
HP is the only 2D printer vendor spending big on 3D printing. Indeed, HP has set its sites on helping lead the “4th Industrial Revolution.” That’s “a far-reaching analog-to-digital shift that will completely transform the $12 trillion global manufacturing industry.” But success is not assured. HP first talked about 3D printers in 2013, but it didn’t ship its Multi Jet Fusion device (late of course) until 2016. Moreover, HP has never once attached any kind of financial figures to its 3D business, or ever discussed when and to what degree that business will become materially important in its overall results. Remember, it’s been fifteen years since HP entered the production/graphic arts printing industry. And despite some success, HP has still not released any specific financial metrics for that business. One can only surmise it’s still a tiny sliver of HP’s printing sales. And 3D is many years and many millions behind that segment.
The other exception is Xerox, which apparently never got the memo that fatuous 3D news was out of style. There’s no other explanation for Xerox’s breathy claim that 3D printing is a key part of its “new” future, thanks to old PARC research and spending $4 million to buy a tiny start-up just in time to mention 3D printing at its February investor conference. Still, Xerox swears its 3D technology is “nearing commercialization.”
So what gives? Nomenclature is a starting point. The term “3D printing” hasn’t disappeared, but it’s increasingly being supplanted by “additive manufacturing,” or AM for short. It’s not just semantics. Words matter. And AM is indicative of where the technology will make a critical difference, and hence where it’s heading. GE calls AM “a broader and more inclusive term” than 3D, which is frequently and somewhat disparagingly relegated to lower-end devices that can slowly produce one-off, low resolution, low quality objects that are primarily ornamental. And unlike 3D printing, AM has no overt link to the shrinking, backward-facing world of 2D output.
The underlying dichotomy is borne out in the data. Wohlers said the number of companies making industrial (over $5,000) AM devices grew from 135 in 2017 to 177 in 2018. Meanwhile growth weakened in the consumer (under $5,000) end of 3D printing, with several vendors shutting down or exiting the market. Stratasys and 3D Systems, which both bet big on low-end devices, have seen their market caps fall 80% in five years, even as their actual sales have risen.
It’s clear now that, aside from the word “print” and some links to inkjet technology, there never was any real corporate or business synergy between the 2D and 3D worlds. Hardcopy hubris, combined with a desperate need for something new, caused many print vendors to dabble in 3D. But dabbling doesn’t cut it. In fact, those words should be etched over the entry to every hardcopy corporate headquarters. It’s good news now that most vendors never spent much on their 3D dabbling, but it was yet another detour from the path towards truly meaningful diversification.
From the September 2019 Issue - “Irrational Exuberance?"
The phrase “irrational exuberance” entered the vernacular in 1996. Then Federal Reserve Bank Chairman Alan Greenspan used it in a speech to describe a concern he had for the way the values of certain assets had recently been rising in the economy. At the time, he was referring mostly to early dot-com companies. These days, the 93-year old Greenspan seldom comments on the economy. But if he did, one wonders if he’d use “irrational exuberance” to characterize the growing rash of MFP dealer acquisitions.
In just the past three years, around 250 US dealers have been acquired. Many were purchased directly by larger dealers; some by hardcopy manufacturers. While the pace has surely hastened, it’s hardly a new development. But what has changed is the growing presence of professional investment funds and private equity money, either to buy key dealers or to fund avowed channel consolidators, such as FlexPrint, Visual Edge, Marco and UBEO. There’s also the potential for Staples/DEX to become a truly disruptive PE-funded force in the dealer channel.
It’s not that the (mostly US) office equipment dealers being purchased are weak companies, have bad management, or are delivering poor financial results. It’s actually quite the opposite. They’re typically the cream of the crop. And the valuations are certainly not all that exorbitant compared to many other kinds of IT businesses. Paying more than two times trailing annual sales for an MFP dealer is still exceedingly rare.
What increasingly concerns me is the basis on which purchasers are justifying their acquisitions, and the higher prices they seem willing to pay. The issue is not so much when a local dealer buys a small competing dealer or broadens its territory via acquisition. And it’s also not when a manufacturer fills a distribution hole or protects its current coverage by purchasing a dealer. My questions relate to the professional money that’s so aggressively funding this new era of roll-ups.
These types of investors and that kind of money are neither patient nor transformative. PE firms aren’t in the business of mentoring and molding. Their strategy rests on buying decent companies, slashing expenses, curtailing big new investments, perhaps loading the company up with debt, and then finding someone else to purchase the whole thing in five or so years. PE firms couldn’t care less who or what the buyer is. It could be new shareholders via the stock market; a related hardware, software or IT channel player; or just another channel roll-up company.
And there’s the rub. These professional money people are acquiring good or even great dealers that are already outperforming their peers, But this is a hardcopy industry that’s shrinking (slowly now, faster later), in need of massive investment and major transformation, and facing entrenched competition as it seeks to diversify.
Let me be brutally clear, without significant new money, fresh ideas, and a bit of luck, there’s little reason to believe most of today’s MFP dealers will be bigger or more valuable five years from now. And to the extent they are, it will have come mostly from doubling down on a declining industry and purchasing smaller competitors. All that only postpones the day of reckoning, and it makes massive change even more difficult. None of that’s a prescription for successful investing in the PE world.
I’d be more sanguine if there were evidence big swaths of the dealer community were further along the bumpy road toward becoming diversified players in the IT channel. But there are hardly any valid proof points out there. Perusing the latest data from the 34th Annual Dealer Survey in The Cannata Report puts the kibosh on any optimism in that regard.
These aren’t also-ran dealerships. The average one in the survey had $16.3 million in revenue, and 65% of them reported higher sales last year. But look at managed network services (MNS). For years now, it’s been hyped as absolutely the best adjacent alternative marketplace into which MFP dealers should invest and can diversify.
The Cannata survey found fewer than half of all dealers (44%) have even dabbled in MNS, and the majority of those who had (56%) derived less than 5% of their revenue from that business. Even the most accomplished dealers almost never got over 10% of their sales from MNS. The vast majority of dealers are taking a go-slow approach to MNS, either growing the business themselves (57%) or partnering with an OEM or another company that’s already doing it (45%). Only 19% said they had acquired an MNS provider to enter the market. Moreover, none of this says anything about whether dealers are making money in MNS, let alone MFP-style profits. Anecdotally, many successful midsize dealers tell me it takes several years in MNS just to break even.
And there’s the rub. I realize I’m the oddball here, but I just can’t believe today’s “smart” PE money is funding so many acquisitions of dealers who have proven supremely adept at serving yesterday’s shrinking MFP market, but are barely in the very earliest stages of figuring out how to reinvent themselves for tomorrow. I just don’t see the path or the time frame for a huge PE payoff down the line. So color me skeptical.
From the August 2019 Issue - “Tick-Tock ... I Don’t Get This Clock”
It’s been a dozen years since hardcopy device placements and printed pages peaked globally. And it’s been a decade since the Great Recession ended. So one might think hardcopy vendors — especially the biggest and most print-dependent ones — would have spent the past ten years steering their respective companies toward new opportunities. Unfortunately, one would largely be wrong to think the results from sound policies of diversification would now be evident.
After all, these vendors are public companies with a fiduciary responsibility to stockholders, and a moral responsibility to employees, partners, suppliers and communities. True, there have been two instances in which important hardcopy vendors did aggressively diversify. Xerox acquired ACS in 2009 to expand into BPO and IT services, and Lexmark bought multiple document capture and management software firms from 2010 to 2015. But both companies failed, and those deals were unraveled in 2017.
So I decided this month to get a better grasp of where hardcopy vendor diversification stands today. I looked at total revenue and hardcopy revenue for the nine largest print vendors that depend most significantly on hardcopy as a share of their business. I did this for 2008 — a decade ago and in the midst of the Great Recession — and for 2018 or the closest complete fiscal year. And what I found is cause for great concern, both individually for nearly every major vendor and for the entire hardcopy industry.
The nine vendors I evaluated were Brother, Canon, Epson, Fujifilm, HP, Konica Minolta, Lexmark (even though it’s no longer a separate company), Ricoh, and Xerox. I obtained revenue data from each company’s public financial reports. I converted yen values for the Japanese vendors to dollars using contemporaneous exchange rates. Yes, I understand the limitations of that approach. But since my focus was on hardcopy revenue intensity, rather than absolute revenue numbers, I think it was a reasonable approach.
For the most part, I used vendors’ own categorization of what constituted print revenue, including consumer, office, production and industrial print. However, it can be difficult to figure out what to do with revenue these vendors report for adjacent services and software, particularly revenue from IT services, BPO services, and ECM solutions. Suffice to say, I used my best judgment to try and produce data that was comparable.
First, the big picture. These top nine vendors did $125 billion in hardcopy revenue in 2008, which accounted for 49% of their combined total revenue. Those same vendors generated $91 billion in print revenue in 2018, representing 53% of their combined revenue. So over the past decade, their collective hardcopy revenue fell 27%, but their total revenue dropped 33%. So their collective hardcopy revenue intensity rose 4%. But the average hardcopy revenue intensity for the nine companies did drop by a slight 1.5%.
In other words — and very sadly — there is no indication from revenue that the biggest, most print-dependant vendors have done a whole lot to lessen their reliance on a clearly declining print industry. In fact, even the slight drop in average dependence on printing among these top vendors is more because their non-print revenue fell faster than their print revenue.
As one might expect, there was certainly variability among the companies. Basically, there were three clusters of vendors. Xerox and Lexmark are straightforward. They were both nearly 100% dependent on printing in 2008 and in 2018, despite what happened in between. And their printing revenue dropped more than 40% over the past decade.
Conversely, HP, Epson and Konica Minolta actually ended up more dependant on hardcopy in 2018 than they were in 2008. Of course, HP did split off half the company to form HPE in 2015, but its print revenue also decreased by almost 30%. Konica Minolta became more dependent on printing because its non-print revenue fell faster than its print revenue fell. And with Epson, its printing revenue was pretty much the same in 2018 as it was in 2008, but its non-print revenue declined 13% during that same decade.
Ricoh, Canon, Brother and Fujifilm did manage to reduce the portion of revenue they got from printing between 2008 and 2018 by 20%, 9%, 8% and 3%, respectively. But each case is different. Fujifilm achieved this by having its print revenue fall faster than its non-print revenue fell. Ricoh and Canon did it by boosting their non-print revenue, although much less than the declines they experienced in hardcopy revenue.
That leaves Brother, which was the only vendor on my list of nine companies that grew its hardcopy revenue — largely due to the purchase of Domino in 2015 — and also grew the non-print (albeit smaller) side of its business even more in dollar terms. So there’s one sort of success.
But from my admittedly jaded perspective, here’s the bottom line. The top print-dependent vendors have experienced a lost decade to meaningfully lessen their individual and collective reliance on a shrinking hardcopy industry. So how likely is it that they’ll get it right over the next decade?
From the July 2019 Issue - “On Borrowed Time?”
We all know that old saw, “Nothing is certain but death and taxes.” Well, I’m adding a third item to that list: RECESSION! And while most folks tend to make plans for dealing with death and taxes, few people — or companies — seem to plan for the eventuality of the next recession. Certainly, there’s no evidence that hardcopy vendors are planning for the next big downturn, and all the drama and damage it will portend for printing.
That’s too bad, but it shouldn’t come as a surprise. We’ve been on borrowed time. In July, the economic expansion that began a decade ago in June 2009 became the longest in US history. By some measures, the odds of a downturn are now the same as back in July 2007. That’s when the subprime debt crisis that brought on the Great Recession kicked into high gear. Depending on the forecast and what’s being monitored, the odds now are between 20% and 65% that the US will experience the first of two or more consecutive quarters of GDP contraction in the next year. And that’s how we define a recession.
Because today’s trade brinksmanship is the main catalyst, the coming recession will spread from the US to China and beyond. Even if it were to be shallower, shorter and less global than the Great Recession, the impact across the printing market could end up being more deleterious.
For too many in the hardcopy world, the Great Recession is but an increasingly distant memory. But it’s critical to recall the destruction that was brought down on printing. Through 2008, there had generally been a strong correlation between GDP and cutsheet paper sales, particularly in the US. When the economy grew, so did print volume; and when the economy contracted, so too did sales of cutsheet stock. That all ended in 2008, with some help from the Great Recession.
It’s now more than a decade later, and 2008 still stands as the peak for total printed pages in the US and worldwide. And not coincidentally, 2007 had marked the zenith for total hardcopy device placements. I editorialized about these terrifying twin peaks a decade ago (“Peak-a-Boo-Hoo,” May 09). I postulated back then that even a quick return to modest growth in placements would yield a lost decade before sales of hardcopy devices reached pre-recession levels. It’s clear now that was a pie-in-the-sky dream. In fact, such lofty levels of placements and pages have never again been reached. Instead, both key metrics have sloped downward ever since.
I’ll be the first to admit I have a mixed record with my warnings and predictions, but I’m going to take a bow for that old editorial. What I recommended for the industry and its players back in 2009 was spot on. I called it the “Four C’s.” My sage advice called for consolidation to eliminate weaker vendors and grow share in a stagnant market; culling to get rid of excess plants, people and sales outlets; creativity in developing new service and software revenue streams; and cash, which would determine who could manage to invest the most and hold on the longest.
Sadly, hardcopy companies haven’t done anywhere nearly as much as they needed to on any of these four fronts. That’s why I believe the coming inevitable recession will be extremely painful for this industry.
Currently, there are no truly successful hardcopy companies. Vendors like HP, Canon and Konica Minolta have at various times in recent years produced pretty good numbers on their top line or their bottom line, although seldom for both. But a couple or few good quarters has proven to be a poor predictor of what’s next. Look no further than the latest figures covered in the issue for some top MFP vendors.
The biggest missed opportunity is been that vendors have failed to make, buy or grow successful ancillary or unrelated businesses that materially lessen their dependence on hardcopy. All that’s saved these companies is that moderately well run hardcopy operations still throw off lots of cash. Sadly, way too much of that cash has been wasted on shortsighted stock buybacks and ill-conceived acquisitions. In short, the industry has wasted the fruits of an unprecedented decade-long economic expansion. And this must be seen for what it truly is — a failure of strategy, leadership and execution of the highest order.
So what should we expect a year or two or three from now, when we’re all in the midst of a recession? That long-promised vendor consolidation? It will be in full swing. But these won’t be marriages of strength; it will be the mediocre buying the weak. And there will be casualties. Some companies will close down their printing units, or sell them off at fire sale prices. Cash to fund belated diversification will be in short supply. Just a few vendors will hop over to become small makers of industrial or 3-D print devices.
Hardcopy technology providers and software partners are already heading for the hills. I expect their customers — and their ever-younger leaders and employees — will really step up efforts to transform workflows such that a lot more paper is eliminated forever. In the channel, most small dealers will vanish, while a few large dealers will leverage their hardcopy cash to buy a new future in some adjacent segment of the IT world. In short. It’s gonna be ugly. ... Real ugly.
From the June 2019 Issue - “Let’s Tame the Rapture Over Capture”
Those who make, sell and comment on office MFPs — and that includes yours truly here — have long exhibited a certain rapturous infatuation with the scanning function on said devices. Document capture has been seen, inter alia, as a foundational differentiator between MFPs and single-function printers; an overdue enabler for digital communication; a catalyst for application development and integration; and a springboard for improved business workflows and efficiency.
And to varying degrees, all of the above have proven to be true. Unfortunately for the industry, however, what’s also increasingly true is that there’s not a terribly large, growing or profitable return on all that’s collectively been invested in MFP-based scanning hardware, software, marketing, partnering, sales and support. And there’s good reason to believe things will only get worse, or at best they’ll stay the same.
There is some good news ... for customers and those who have to keep them happy. The ease of use, quality, speed and reliability of scanners on office-grade MFPs have never been better. Vendors are increasingly including or offering single-pass duplex document feeders that operate much faster than the print engines with which they’re paired. Good image enhancement and misfeed detection are less rare than they used to be. Smartphone-like control panels and one-button scanning are pretty much the norm. And integration with the cloud is almost a given. So the once canyonlike gap between MFPs and document scanners has narrowed appreciably.
However — and it’s a huge however — the volume of scanning in the front office faces stiff headwinds, even while the number of people who are happily scanning remains quite strong. Full disclosure ... this is my own qualitative, anecdotal, logical, but informed assessment. I don’t have reams of data to prove it. So humor me.
Walk-up scanning on a shared office MFP has always been an ad hoc affair, driven by simple communication, personal archival, and extracting or repurposing content. Each of these presumes that paper documents are the most convenient starting point. But not only is the volume of printed pages declining, it’s more likely now one can readily obtain the underlying digital file. It may be in a corporate ECM system, accessible from a line-of-business application, on the web, or simply in the cloud. And increasingly, one can view the document on a phone with a few taps. So scanning is relegated to handling exceptions.
This doesn’t mean that customers will tolerate poor scans or complex capture solutions. But they’re less inclined to pay for capture, or to pay for more advanced or specialized document capture solutions, connectors, apps and services.
We’ve been seeing evidence of this trend for several years. Yet MFP vendors have been telling themselves and their dealers to ignore the facts. So instead, the industry tells itself that rising revenue from more capable, more diverse and more specialized capture solutions is just around the corner, and it’s certain to backfill declining revenue from devices and prints.
But evidence to the contrary is in plain sight. Start with the fact that those early yeoman efforts from some dealers and branches to charge customers for their scans have failed almost universally. Then there’s the troubled track record of vendors and dealers who’ve sought to build profitable scan services businesses. What they found is that backfile conversion is a shrinking niche market. High-volume scanning is done on dedicated scanners, behind the scenes or offsite. And successfully operating a scan service is akin to running a fast food restaurant, with long hours, low wages, lots of staff turnover, low prices, and an elusive quest for consistent quality. Most often, a scan operation has to be run as a totally separate unit.
Then there’s the track record for developers of MFP-oriented scanning software. Look no further than the old Nuance Document Imaging unit, which is now part of Kofax. Nuance’s MFP capture software business was shrinking in absolute and relative terms for years. Rumors have swirled that the company at times had to resort to discounting or even giving away its capture software as a sweetener for deals involving its far more monetizable printing solutions. Meanwhile, the rest of Kofax — as well as capture stalwarts like ABBYY and OpenText — barely pay attention to MFP-related opportunities. And print-centric developers like YSoft and NT-ware have added basic capture capabilities simply as the cost of admission to sell their print solutions.
In the wake of these developments, MFP vendors and their channel partners have been left pursuing oddly bifurcated responses. Either they leap upstream into the world of BPO, ECM, forms processing and perhaps even RPA, where they typically lack expertise and a track record, while facing a host of competitors. Or they dive downmarket into a world of scanning apps, one-touch macros, and cloud capture connectors that may entice some customers but don’t typically generate a lot of new or profitable sales.
None of this is intended to mean there’s absolutely no business for MFP-based capture software. But what it does mean is that capture is no cure-all for what ails the office MFP industry.
From the May 2019 Issue - “So What’s a Bird in the Hand Worth?”
It was quite fitting that HP chose this month to announce its Neverstop Laser products, as May marked the 35th anniversary of HP launching the original LaserJet printer. But it was strange that HP didn’t mention the timing. Perhaps it’s because HP didn’t want to attract too much attention to the broader implications of its news. The Neverstop Laser devices don’t just alter the personal economics of printing. They could portend a fundamental departure from the annuity-based business model that’s undergirded the entire hardcopy industry for the past sixty years.
HP isn’t the first company to start chipping away at the traditional supplies-based revenue stream and profit model. That honor goes to Epson, which a decade ago introduced the first inkjet units with refillable ink tanks. But HP is the first to bring the disruptive economics of ink tanks into new laser devices with refillable toner tanks.
The impetus for this change is the same for inkjet and laser. More customers more often these days are choosing to sidestep the old norms that said it’s best to buy ink and toner made by the same company that built the printer, AIO or MFP you own. One pays more — a lot more — but it’s safer. There have always been customers who opted for lower-priced off-brand supplies, but lately that trend has accelerated. Look at HP’s wobbly printing results this fiscal year to appreciate the massive impact a tiny change in supplies can have on the top-line and the bottom-line.
It’s tempting to dismiss the Neverstop Laser initiative as another halfhearted HP response to this dynamic. After all, the three-year old LaserJet Ultra products were a reaction to the exact same trend. Yet they haven’t gone very far economically or geographically. But there are reasons to believe things will be different this time with HP’s new Neverstop Laser models.
For starters, HP has put quite a lot of marketing muscle behind the Neverstop Laser launch, even in the US and other markets where the products won’t be sold. There’s also the aforementioned supplies-have-once-again-tanked-our-numbers financial issues that are playing out inside HP. And then there’s the underappreciated lesson of what’s quietly happening over in inkjet printing.
Look at Epson. Those first “ME” ink tank models didn’t take the printing world by storm ten years ago. They were few in number, sold only in select markets, and a bit kludgy. But by FY2015, ink tank models were one out of every three inkjet AIOs and printers that Epson sold worldwide. Three years later in FY2018, ink tank models accounted for 58% of Epson’s inkjet placements. And that percentage is expected to reach 63% in FY2019, and 74% in FY2021. By the way, Epson’s total inkjet placement were also 10% higher in FY2018 than in FY2015 ... in a down market. Epson can thank ink tanks for all that.
Don’t you think that history and those outcomes are foremost in HP’s mind when it comes to these very first toner tank devices? I’m also inclined to believe there’s a critical mass of small business shoppers in many developing markets today who own ink tank AIOs or printers, and they’re now favorably inclined to consider similar laser devices.
But how the printing marketplace and vendors react from here on is now sort of a chicken-and-egg issue. Will HP be able to sell enough of its first four Neverstop Laser products? How soon will HP need to expand the number and range of models in terms of speed, color and capability? Will other vendors enter the toner tank business? And will their arrival be guardedly proactive or purely reactive? Competitors took way too long to respond to the global inroads Epson made with its ink tank products. Will laser vendors want to risk repeating that same mistake now with toner tanks?
There’s also something brilliantly devious about all this. Sure, these “tank” models cost more. But they come with a couple years of supplies, and the page costs after that are super low. I can’t help but think vendors are conditioning customers to get increasingly comfortable prepaying for more supplies. Who’s to say ink and toner won’t soon be sold like an extended warranty? The longer the period you opt for up front, the less you pay per page. And lest we forget, prepaid warranties are one of the most profitable items sold in retail markets. In a world of ever-declining print volumes, many buyers will tend to overestimate how much ink or toner they’ll ever use over the life of that printer, AIO or MFP.
Of course, it’s more than a little ironic that HP’s intentional lessening of the role supplies play in the annuity-based economics of printing is taking place at the same time the whole IT industry — including every MFP vendor — is desperately trying to create new annuity-based businesses. You can’t talk to an MFP company these days without some whiz-bang “as-a-service” initiative smacking you in the face, whether it’s SaaS-based ECM, cloud infrastructure, app subscriptions, usage-based scanning, or IT services.
So what’s the lesson? It’s twofold. There’s a need for and an opportunity for business model innovation at both ends of the hardcopy market. And office MFP vendors who overlook what’s happening downmarket do so at their own peril. So tanks a lot.
From the April 2019 Issue - “Soft Lies ... Hard Truths”
Every few years, factions in the hardcopy industry come up with what they believe to be a simple, obvious and brilliant idea. MFP vendors decide they ought to expand into the “adjacent” document management software market. This used to be seen as a way to go on the offensive and grow one’s “share of wallet.” But increasingly, it’s now seen as a defensive stratagem to counter falling placements, pages and prices.
But there’s one teeny problem. No proof points exist to support the idea that diversifying into document management software (or enterprise content management, cloud storage portals or whatever nom de guerre you choose) is a great move. Indeed, there’s plenty of evidence to the contrary — that the outcome will be somewhere between simply ineffective and downright disastrous. And the odds that an MFP vendor will bomb bigly in this software domain are now greater than ever.
It doesn’t matter if a hardcopy vendor’s particular document management solution is homegrown or acquired, or if it’s above or below par in scope or quality. Look no further than HP with Tower and then Autonomy, and Lexmark with Perceptive, Kofax and multiple others. There was no “1+1=3” with these deals, not for the incumbent hardcopy business and not for the acquired software entities. HP and Lexmark had to sell off or spin off the assets for far less than what they had paid and invested. And those software entities emerged smaller, weaker and with compromised independence. In fact, many relevant parts of these software entities are all but gone.
And there are other examples with less scale and notoriety, like Ricoh with Document Mall (Ricoh Content Manager); Canon with ADOS (Therefore); and Kyocera with Ceyoniq and Alos.
It’s not just acquired solutions that are problematic. Look at DocuShare. Xerox has been beating that dead but homegrown horse nonstop for 22 years. And for what? DocuShare does zippo for Xerox’s hardware and managed services businesses, and those businesses do very little for DocuShare. That Xerox could likely have sold off DocuShare for a moderate sum in years past makes today’s awkwardly naive fawning over the software by a new management team all the more embarrassing and pathetic. Make it stop!
This isn’t to say there aren’t some common threads and lessons to learn. Two of them are biggies. First, hardware and software generally aren’t a great mix for vendors, unless the software is so critically enabling and aligned as to give customers a fundamental reason to buy the hardware. Hardcopy vendors have done their darndest to convince themselves that document /content management software fits this key criterion. But it doesn’t. Case closed. Now hush.
Second and much less appreciated or understood in the hardcopy business is the simple fact that document/content management software — even when done well and with great focus — ain’t that great a business. Waves of consolidation have already come and gone. Sure, some forecasters point to annual growth around 15% for the next few years. But it looks like a lot of that expansion is really driven by widening the definition of what constitutes document/content management to include historically separate but related areas like capture, search, and file sharing.
And to the extent it’s an OK-ish business, revenue generation is overwhelmingly dominated by big players like IBM, Microsoft, Oracle, OpenText, Hyland and Micro Focus. Successful small vendors like Laserfiche, DocuWare and M-Files have had to spent decades attaining and defending their relatively thin slices of this market.
Meanwhile, “the cloud” is changing things big time. In theory, this type of generational disruption creates opportunities for new players. And it sorta is. But those opportunities seem to be accruing to big cloud vendors, like Box and Google and Dropbox. At the same time, incumbent document/content management solution vendors are busily trying to convert their own offerings, channel partners and customers to the cloud. And that doesn’t leave a lot of space for inept printer companies to swoop in for the kill.
So what about MFP vendors who sidestep the business of making or buying the software, and instead just cozy up to some established document/content developers as partners? That can work, but hardcopy companies need to have much more realistic (i.e., low) expectations.
There are only a few such vendors who target MFP channels (e.g., DocuWare, Square-9) or who’ve stumbled into the industry and learned to live with it (e.g., Laserfiche, M-Files). These aren’t big players. Sure, lots of MFP vendors claim to be besties with Hyland, but those vendors together are a tiny sliver of Hyland’s sales. And to the extent MFP vendors have had modest success, it’s precisely because they’ve made no serious efforts to create any pseudo-synergy.
There are some dealers who’ve succeeded with document/content management software, but it’s almost always been separate from or even in spite of what their MFP suppliers have done. The bottom line? MFPs and content software can be friends. They can even date. But they shouldn’t marry. And no one wants to see the offspring.